No judge, no job!: Judicial discretion and incomplete labor contracts by Christmann, Robin
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Christmann, Robin
Working Paper
No judge, no job!: Judicial discretion
and incomplete labor contracts
HWWI Research paper, No. 2-23
Provided in cooperation with:
Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut (HWWI)
Suggested citation: Christmann, Robin (2010) : No judge, no job!: Judicial discretion and
incomplete labor contracts, HWWI Research paper, No. 2-23, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48255 
Paper 2-23 
by the
HWWI Research Programme 
World Economy
HWWI Research
No judge, no job! – Judicial Discretion 
and Incomplete Labor Contracts
Robin Christmann
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) | 2010
ISSN 1861-504XRobin Christmann
Helmut Schmidt University
University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg
christmann@hsu-hh.de
HWWI Research Paper
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)
Heimhuder Str. 71 | 20148 Hamburg | Germany






© Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)
    November 2010
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means 
(electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without 
the prior written permission of the publisher.   No judge, no job! 
  Judicial Discretion and Incomplete Labor Contracts    
 
Robin Christmann1 1 1 1       
       
Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:       
The  decision  making  of  judges  is  prone  to  error  and  misapprehension. 
Consequently, the prevailing literature ties the economic function of courts to dispute 
resolution and minimization of rule making costs. In contrast to previous research, this 
analysis applies a contract theoretic perspective to the ruling of courts and keeps the focus 
on the implemented market transactions. Using labor contracts as institutional setting, 
performance  and  limitations  of  judicial  law  making  are  formally  investigated  and 
compared to the effects of specific legislation. It is shown that the efficient relation of 
legislative  law  making  and  judicial  discretion  is  defined  by  the  characteristics  of  the 
particular field of law and the actual market structure. The model also suggests a mutual 
dependency  between  legislation  and  adjudication  to  establish  efficiency  in  law, 
contradicting the traditional legal doctrines of exclusive legislation or sole case law.       
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1. 1. 1. 1.        INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION       
       
«After all, one way to reduce the cost of agreement is to agree on less.» 
- RICHARD POSNER 1986, P. 513 
Why do we need judges in the first place? When someone signs a contract, he does not 
expect  to  find  himself  in  courtroom  the  next  day.  Instead,  the  legal  institution  of 
contracts2 2 2 2 is meant to define and coordinate the interaction of the contracting parties for 
the time to come. Consequently, any allocation of resources in a modern economy can be 
rooted  to  a  web like  system  of  individual  contracts.  But  even  though  parties  do  not 
anticipate immediate litigation, they are well aware of the fact that pure wording of a 
commitment and its actual authenticity may differ. It is the discrete ruling of courts on 
similar, but disputed transactions that affects the expected legal value of their contract, 
thus manipulating the allocative decisions of numerous market participants.   
  However, each time individuals exercise discretion, private incentives and human 
flaws  begin  to  matter.  But  as  judicial  decision  making  remains  subject  to  error,  its 
intrusion  in  resource  allocation  raises  skepticism.  Legal  doctrines  have  developed 
substantially  different  approaches  to  account  for  the  imperfection  of  courts:  in  the 
common  law,  the  incentive  to  litigate  false  judicial  decisions  guarantees  its  long term 
efficiency; in the civil law tradition the margin of judicial error is minimized through 
binding codification. Recent developments have corroded this traditional distinction and 
promoted a methodological convergence of legal systems (see Fon and Parisi 2009). Thus 
the traditional role and scope of judicial decision making is in flux. 
  It is the object of this article to investigate the performance and limitations of 
judicial lawmaking, hence contributing to a general understanding of the economic role of 
courts. This will be exemplified for the case of labor jurisdiction. Therefore court ruling is 
introduced into a formal analysis of labor contracts, which is derived from a Buyer – Seller 
Model  by  Zhu  and  Zhang  (2000).  The  stipulated  principal  agent  game  allows  the 
                                                           
2 2 2 2 From an economic perspective, a contract is the sum of constraints imposed on the strategic behavior of 
parties by the prevailing institutional setting. An introduction to contract theory provide Salanié (1999) and 
Hart and Holmström (1987). 2 
 
identification of various information and control constraints of the contracting parties. 
Initially, the potential effect of court ruling on the implementation of labor contracts is 
analyzed. In a second step, the specificity of legal rules is introduced into the model. 
Consequently,  it  will  be  determined  under  which  preconditions  judicial  law  making 
supersedes specific legislation. 
  The organization of this article is as follows: in Section 2, I describe the setting of 
the  formal  contract  model.  The  implementation  of  the  labor  contract  with  respect  to 
judicial discretion is analyzed in Section 3. The mutual dependence of legislation and 
court ruling and the impact on social outcome are then stylized in Section 4. In Section 5, 
I will discuss the theoretical findings and provide some insight on decisive factors for the 
composition of law. Section 6 concludes the analysis. 
This  article  follows  a  diverse  literature  to  the  function  and  scope  of  courts. 
However, two different perspectives have developed in the law and economics field: The 
first strand of research integrates the evaluation of judicial lawmaking into the rules vs. 
discretion  debate,  in  which  the  variable  costs  of  adjudication  and  the  fixed  costs  of 
legislation determine the optimal scope of court decisions (see, for example, Sullivan 1991; 
Ehrlich  and  Posner  1974;  Fon  and  Parisi  2009).  In  this  setting,  the judge  is  a  passive 
arbitrary mechanism (Hayek 1980) which only serves the minimization of social costs. 
The  socially  desirable  performance  of  judicial  law  making  is  also  emphasized  by  the 
efficiency hypothesis of case law jurisdiction (Landes and Posner 1976; Rubin 1977; Priest 
1977;  Cooter  and  Rubinfeld  1989;  Mahoney  and  Sanchirico  2005).  However, 
Shavell (1981) and Kaplow (1986) showed that private incentives to litigate may diverge 
from  the  social  benefit,  hence  inducing  excessive  externalities  through  adjudication. 
Furthermore, Shleifer, Posner and Niblett (2008) found no empirical evidence for any 
convergence  of  case  law  to  a  stable  resting  point  which  would  eventually  reduce 
uncertainty in the legal system. 
  The second strand investigates the individual resolution of disputes: courts are to 
maximize  the  utility  of  the  litigating  parties.  Hence,  judicial  presumptions  in  court 
(Bernado, Talley and Welch 2000) as well as the ability of the judge to interpret vague 
contracts  (Shavell  2006)  promote  efficiency.  Additionally,  judges  may  intervene  in 3 
 
unbalanced contracts with one sided risk distribution, thereby hedging the parties from 
unforeseen contingencies (Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite 2006). Schwartz and Watson 
(2004) criticize that the court´s skill to interpret also induces the implementation of less 
accurate  contracts  by  the  parties  while  at  the  same  time  raising  the  wasteful  costs  of 
litigation. At last, the resolution of disputes may be severely biased, if judges themselves 
are accepted as rational maximizing men (see, for example, Posner 1986; Shapiro and Levy 
1995; Fon and Parisi 2003; Miceli and Cosgel 1994).    
 
2. 2. 2. 2.        THE MODEL THE MODEL THE MODEL THE MODEL       
       
Contract  theory  provides  a  promising  setting for  a formal  analysis  of judicial decision 
making. This particular approach is derived from a discrete modeling of a reciprocal trade 
contract  by  Zhu  and  Zhang  (2000),  who  illustrated  that  imperfect  verification  of 
contingencies  do  not  necessarily  defeat  contracting  altogether.    They  prove  with  a 
standard buyer – seller – model that as long as the court´s decision is not arbitrary, an 
efficient outcome can be reached through renegotiations by the contracting parties.  
  This model of a reciprocal contract can be transferred to labor contracts. In the 
buyer – seller – model, the traded good is specifically for the buyer´s use with no outside 
value,  creating  uneven  bargaining  power  for  the  seller  in  ex  post  negotiations.  This 
dependence of the seller on binding contracts for production can be compared to the 
typical asymmetric structure of labor contracts. The performance of an employee has no 
ex post outside value, creating a similar contracting problem to the buyer – seller   model. 
In order to conduct an analysis of social outcome, I develop a continuous version of the 
contract  model.  Also,  this  adaption  treats  optimality  and  induced  welfare  loss  as 
endogenous. 
  The labor contract is modeled as a non cooperative game with two parties. The 
agent  (employee)  can  provide  a  service  to  the  company  with  the  quality  of  his 
performance q. In doing so he incurs an opportunity cost C(q), depending on the chosen 
quality. The cost of performance stylizes the lost utility of alternative activities like leisure 
or shirking. The principal (employer) has a valuation V(q) for the service, depending on 4 
 
quality of performance and reflecting its utility in the company´s production process. In 
order  to  obtain  the  service,  the  principal  offers  a  wage  W(q)  to  the  agent.  Suppose 
 ´( ) >  0,  ´´( ) >  0,  (0) =  0 and  ´( )  >  0.  The  functions  C(q),  V(q)  and  the 
variable q are fully observable to both parties. 
In this setting, any allocation [q, W(q)] can be interpreted as labor contract. The 
binding contract stipulates a wage payment W(q) for any chosen quality of performance 
by the agent. It is assumed the observable quality q is difficult to verify to a third party, 
caused either by difficulties in defining the desired service in the written contract or by 
lack  of factual  evidence.  Thus  an  implemented  contract  contingent on  quality q  faces 
imperfect  verification,  if  dispute  arises.  Therefore,  the  parties  can  only  choose  an 
incomplete labor contract for the desired transaction. 
However, if the agreed transaction fails, for example because one party performs 
badly or payment is withheld, the contract can be enforced as written in court. In this 
case, the incompleteness of the contract produces the risk of false assessment of the factual 
quality by the judge. This leaves the court ruling subject to error. The decision making of 
the judge is hence modeled as an exogenous probability vector  (   ,     ).     stylizes the 
probability  that  the  judge  correctly  assesses  the  true  quality  q.  Consequently,        is  the 
probability  that  the  judge  believes  q  is  the  true  quality,  while  the  factual  quality  of 
performance  is    .  Suppose   ≥     and      ≥       .  Thereby,  court  ruling  can  be  fully 
described  by 1 −   as  the  alpha  error  and       as  the  beta  error  of  judicial  decision 
making. It is assumed that both parties form equal expectation about the accuracy of court 
ruling.3 3 3 3  
Litigation, however, is costly for the contracting parties. Filing a case generates 
constant  cost  of  contract  enforcement  LP  and  LA  for  the  principal  and  the  agent 
                                                           
3 3 3 3 This is a simplifying, but not a critical assumption. If there are deviations and parties have different 
expectations about the potential court ruling, parties might still file a case at the optimum in contrast to 
abstaining from law suit under equal expectations. In this setting, renegotiations always fail if the principal 
estimates the validity of court ruling to be lower than the agent does (see Zhu [2000] for a detailed description 
of this variation).  
respectively.  The  charges  include  process  costs  and  attorney  fees
simplification, these expenses are due irrespectively of the outcome of the 
Furthermore,  suppose  the  principal  has  all  the  bargaining  power.  As  there  are 
potentially many agents who can provide the desired service, the employer 
offer a take it or leave it contract. In addition, 
costless and can be conducted by the contracting parties whenever dispute arises. Lastly, 
parties are risk neutral and have enough funds to bear unl
The non cooperative game of the modeled 
as displayed in Figure 1: The contract offer by the principal (stage 1), the performance of 
the agent (stage 2), and, if dispute arises, a 
the law suit (stage 4). ∏ 
  and  
respectively at stage n. 
Figure 1 Figure 1 Figure 1 Figure 1
At stage 1, the employer offers a 
the demanded quality of service
the  offer,  no  transaction  takes  place  and  both  parties  gain  a  utility  of  zero.  Upon 
agreement to work for the company, 
stage 2, specified as factual quality of service 
the implementation of a contract and both parties stick to the agreement. Then the game 
                                                           
4 4 4 4 It is a common legal procedure that on
further hindering false claims. However, this remains an institutional choice. To prevent interference with the 
implications of court ruling itself, this procedure is not applied here
variation does not alter the results of the model.
5 5 5 5 See the Appendix for formal proof that 
beneficial mechanism of the contract.
5 
respectively.  The  charges  include  process  costs  and  attorney  fees
simplification, these expenses are due irrespectively of the outcome of the 
Furthermore,  suppose  the  principal  has  all  the  bargaining  power.  As  there  are 
potentially many agents who can provide the desired service, the employer 
contract. In addition, pre trial renegotiations are assumed to be 
costless and can be conducted by the contracting parties whenever dispute arises. Lastly, 
neutral and have enough funds to bear unlimited liability.
cooperative game of the modeled labor contract is divided into four stages 
: The contract offer by the principal (stage 1), the performance of 
if dispute arises, a pre trial renegotiation (stage 3) and 
and  ∏ 
  stylize the expected revenue of principal and agent 
Figure 1 Figure 1 Figure 1 Figure 1. Extensive form of the contracting game 
, the employer offers a labor contract to a potential employee, specifying 
service     and the wage payment W(q). If the employee rejects 
the  offer,  no  transaction  takes  place  and  both  parties  gain  a  utility  of  zero.  Upon 
to work for the company, the employee chooses a level of effort in his job
quality of service q. It is feasible that no frictions occur during 
the implementation of a contract and both parties stick to the agreement. Then the game 
                   
that only the succumbing party of the trial bears the litigation costs, thereby 
further hindering false claims. However, this remains an institutional choice. To prevent interference with the 
implications of court ruling itself, this procedure is not applied here. It is proven in the Appendix that this 
variation does not alter the results of the model. 
Appendix for formal proof that risk-aversion or limited funds of the agent do not stall the illustrated 
beneficial mechanism of the contract. 
respectively.  The  charges  include  process  costs  and  attorney  fees.  For  matters  of 
simplification, these expenses are due irrespectively of the outcome of the law suit.4 4 4 4 
Furthermore,  suppose  the  principal  has  all  the  bargaining  power.  As  there  are 
potentially many agents who can provide the desired service, the employer is enabled to 
renegotiations are assumed to be 
costless and can be conducted by the contracting parties whenever dispute arises. Lastly, 
imited liability.5 5 5 5 
vided into four stages 
: The contract offer by the principal (stage 1), the performance of 
renegotiation (stage 3) and eventually 
stylize the expected revenue of principal and agent 
 
contract to a potential employee, specifying 
If the employee rejects 
the  offer,  no  transaction  takes  place  and  both  parties  gain  a  utility  of  zero.  Upon 
chooses a level of effort in his job at 
that no frictions occur during 
the implementation of a contract and both parties stick to the agreement. Then the game 
ly the succumbing party of the trial bears the litigation costs, thereby 
further hindering false claims. However, this remains an institutional choice. To prevent interference with the 
. It is proven in the Appendix that this 
aversion or limited funds of the agent do not stall the illustrated 6 
 
ends at this stage, resulting in the utility ∏ 
  and ∏ 
 . In case of dispute, for instance if the 
employee shirks his duties, the contract is renegotiated.6 6 6 6 The employer, again endorsed 
with  complete  bargaining  power,  may  offer  a  payment    to  settle  the  matter.  The 
rational employee is willing to accept the payment, if filing the case is not a favorable 
option,    ≥ ∏ 
 . Hence, the game ends with a pre trial settlement, yielding ∏ 
  und 
∏ 
 . However, if the renegotiation fails, the parties proceed to court and the final ruling 
of  the  judge  stipulates  the  effective  payment      to  the  employee.  Thus,  additional 
enforcement costs    and    are assigned to the contracting parties.  
 
3. 3. 3. 3.        LABOR LABOR LABOR LABOR       CO CO CO CONTRACTS AND IMPERFECT COURT RULING NTRACTS AND IMPERFECT COURT RULING NTRACTS AND IMPERFECT COURT RULING NTRACTS AND IMPERFECT COURT RULING              
 
Having full bargaining power, the principal maximizes his revenue through the design of 
an optimal contract. As in standard game theory, this mutual optimization problem can be 
solved applying backward induction. Consequently, the analysis starts at stage 4. 
  In the case of litigation, the judge will enforce the labor contract and determine 
the factual wage payment     . The agent forms rational expectations about the outcome of 
trial   ∏   =          +  1 −            −   . In court, the verdict will correctly 
stipulate  the  agreed  payment  W(q)  with  probability    .  However,  the  court  will  be 
mistaken in the assessment of the true quality of performance with probability 1 −    , 
hence  determining  a  lower  payment        to  the  agent.  In  addition,  the  litigation 
produces a cost    for the agent. It is intuitive that the cost of effort C(q) are sunk at this 
stage and not relevant for the agent´s decision. 
  A rational principal expects this consideration of the agent (stage 3) and will offer a 
settlement payment    ≥          +  1 −             −    such that the agent is at 
least indifferent to accepting or rejecting it. A settlement is always advantageous for the 
                                                           
6 6 6 6 The condition for a breach of contract at stage 2 is not endogenously modeled. It is proven in Chapter Three 
that it is irrelevant to the implemented allocation whether the contract is executed as written or renegotiated 
in case of frictions.  7 
 
principal, because it cuts the effective wage payment     by    and additionally saves own 
litigation expenses   . 
  As indicated above, the imperfect verification of the factual quality q creates an 
agency problem  to  the  principal,  which  he  seeks  to  avoid  while  implementing  the 
contract (stage 2). However, the agent would only take advantage of the principal´s lack 
of control, if this does not place him in an unfavorable position in court. Consequently, 
the  agent  will  show  the  desired  effort,  if  and  only  if    −   ( ) ≥      −   (   ) or 
 ( ) −   (   ) ≥ 
 ( )   (   )
          
. Under that condition good performance is preferable 
to shirking, thus determining the incentive compatibility constraint of the contract. 
  At last, the offered contract [q, W(q)] of the principal has to be accepted by the 
agent at stage 1. This will only be achieved, if the contract fulfilling agent can cover his 
opportunity costs through the expected payment. As the agent cannot control the risk of 
future  litigation,  the  participation  constraint       ( ) +  1 −       (   ) −    ≥
 ( ) has to be satisfied.  
Hence, the optimization problem of the maximizing principal is defined as 
  ∏      =       −       
  ⇒     !            (1) 
         −         ≥ 
            
          
            (2) 
             +  1 −             −    ≥              (3) 
Due to the reciprocal nature of the contract, the principal is maximizing his profit with 
respect to the decision q of the agent (1). The fulfillment of side conditions (2) and (3) 
ensures  that  the  determined  profit  maximizing  quality  q*  can  also  be  implemented 
through a contract. Assuming that these side conditions are binding in the optimum, they 
can be solved for W(q) and inserted into (1). A differentiation with respect to q then 
yields the following First – Order Condition 
     ´    − 
          ´   
          
 = 0             (4) 
As  the  functions  V(q)  and  C(q)  and  the  vector  g  are  common  knowledge,  the  profit 
maximizing quality q* can be determined.  8 
 
However, the labor contract will only produce this socially favorable outcome, if 
the indicated agency – problem is overcome. Therefore, the principal has to establish the 
contingent wage payment W(q) in order to stipulate the desired behavior of the agent, 
satisfying  both  the  participation  constraint  and  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint. 
Firstly,  a  contract  is  always  incentive  compatible,  if  any  deviation  from  the  target 
optimum  q*  is  never  favorable  to  the  decision  maker.  Thus, 
 (  ∗) −   ( ) ≥  
 ( ∗)   ( )
          
 has  to  be  satisfied.  Secondly,  the  participation 
constraint (3) protects a contract fulfilling agent from bearing a loss through unfortunate 
litigation. The rational agent will reject any contract that produces a net loss in litigation, 
although his claims are legitimate. Otherwise the principal could strategically threaten to 
file the suit to corner the agent, thereby exploiting the setting of asymmetric bargaining. 
In order to specify (3), it is assumed the constraint insures the risk neutral agent against 
the  expected  value  of  a  complete  disaster  in  court,     = 0,  either  caused  by  a  wrong 
assessment of the judge or by strategic claims of the principal. Then, the participation 
constraint determines the exact wage payment at the optimum with   =   ∗ and     = 0. 
Solved to W(q*) and equating with the incentive compatibility constraint, this determines 
the  contingent  wage  function as   ( ) = 
 ( )
         
− 
       ( ∗)
         
+    .  The  optimal 
payment W*(q) of the contract then is 
  ∗ ( ) =  
 ( )
          
− 
      ( ∗)
         
+         ,if 0 ≤ q  ≤ q ∗           
            ( ∗)
         
+                 ,if q >   ∗                     
        (5) 
The distinction of cases in the wage function (5) cannot be avoided, as the differentiable 
function W(q) could not support the optimum q* due to W´(q) > C`(q) for all q.7 7 7 7 The 
optimal payment W*(q) is incentive compatible in the interval [0, q*] and maximizes the 
profit of the principal at quality q*. For q > q*, the function yields constant payments to 
                                                           
7 7 7 7 The common First – Order approach in contract theory is not applicable in this setting. The payoff function of 
the agent cannot be altered to satisfy  ´(  ∗) =
 ´( ∗)
   
 in order to support the optimum q*. Eventually, this 
always violates the incentive compatibility constraint of the contract due to 
 ´( ∗)
   
< 
 ´( ∗)
         
. 9 
 
the agent. But as opportunity costs are rising in q, the agent has no incentive to choose 
such a performance. 
  The  resulting  payoff  function  of  the  agent  proves  the  allocative  irrelevance  of 
distinction between fulfilled and disputed contracts. If the contract is executed as written 
(stage  2),  the  payoff  function  of  the  agent  is  characterized  as ∏ 
  =   ∗     −      . 
Consequently, the applying First Order Condition is 
 ´   
         
>  ´    within the interval 
[0; q*] and 0 <  ´    for (q*; ∞]. In the case of renegotiation (stage 3), the relevant payoff 
function is ∏ 
  =          ∗  +  1 −             −    −     . The First Order Condition can 
then  be  derived  as 
          ´   
         
>  ´    within  the  interval  [0; q*]  and 0 <   ´    for 
(q*; ∞]. Evidently, choosing quality q* is always maximizing the returns of the contracting 
agent. The implemented allocation therefore is independent of the future end state of the 
contract. 
  The social goal is to maximize the allocative outcome, stipulated by the imperfect 
labor contract. Consider   =      −       as the social welfare function of the economy, 
then optimality is defined as the balance of marginal utilities with 
 ´   
 ´    = 1. Labor will 
be contracted according to the principal´s maximization problem (1), thus implementing 
the optimal quality of performance q*. The ratio of marginal utilities then is indicated by 
   
 ´   
 ´    = 
        
         
 ≥ 1               (6) 
Evidently, the labor contract only implements social optimality, if court ruling is perfect 
and not subject to error (    = 1). Otherwise the end state of the contract is characterized 
as second best, yielding a benefit contingent on the accuracy of the judicial decision as 
plotted by Figure 2. As long as the decision of the judge is not arbitrary,     >      , the 
rational parties can induce a socially beneficial outcome by contracting despite imperfect 
verification. Only in the extreme case of     =      , the contract becomes fully unverifiable 
by the court and the desirable transaction is stalled.  
Figure 2 Figure 2 Figure 2 Figure 2
  Despite its imperfection, the end state of the 
improvement compared to a setting without jurisdiction. In 
would be dependent on the courtesy of the principal in any dispute
the ex ante contract. Facing opportunity costs of performance, the rational agent would 
always  abstain  from  contracting  in  such  an  unbalanced  setting.  Eventually,  only  the 
opportunity to enforce a contract as written resolves the asy
As  a  corollary,  the  rational  expectations  about  the  accuracy  of  court  ruling 
determine the efficiency of the contract. The socially wasteful litigation process itself has 
no  allocative  effect,  and  is 
Generally, the more the parties expect the courts to correctly assess the exe
contract, the larger is the implemented social benefit. 
the true probability vector g affects 
of  legal  precedence  and  past  verdicts,  which  provide  signals  to  numerous  contractors 
about the future ruling of courts and about the interpretation of imperfect contracts. Thus, 
this judicial signaling is the most valuable service of courts to market participants and 






Figure 2 Figure 2 Figure 2 Figure 2. . . . Implication of judicial signaling 
Despite its imperfection, the end state of the labor contract establishes a 
improvement compared to a setting without jurisdiction. In this environment, the agent 
would be dependent on the courtesy of the principal in any dispute, as he cannot enforce 
he ex ante contract. Facing opportunity costs of performance, the rational agent would 
always  abstain  from  contracting  in  such  an  unbalanced  setting.  Eventually,  only  the 
opportunity to enforce a contract as written resolves the asymmetry of the 
As  a  corollary,  the  rational  expectations  about  the  accuracy  of  court  ruling 
determine the efficiency of the contract. The socially wasteful litigation process itself has 
no  allocative  effect,  and  is  fully  avoided  under  the  assumption  of  common  beliefs. 
he more the parties expect the courts to correctly assess the exe
contract, the larger is the implemented social benefit. Consequently, information about 
the true probability vector g affects efficiency. This first result highlights the importance 
and  past  verdicts,  which  provide  signals  to  numerous  contractors 
about the future ruling of courts and about the interpretation of imperfect contracts. Thus, 
g is the most valuable service of courts to market participants and 
stabilizes socially desirable transactions. 
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g is the most valuable service of courts to market participants and 11 
 
4. 4. 4. 4.        OPTIMAL SPECIFI OPTIMAL SPECIFI OPTIMAL SPECIFI OPTIMAL SPECIFICI CI CI CITY OF LAW TY OF LAW TY OF LAW TY OF LAW       
 
Reconsider  the  contract  setting.  Is  the  discrete  ruling  of  courts  still  required,  if  the 
interpretation  of  contracts  can  be  fully  specified  by  legal  rules?  Taking  the  presented 
model as the formal groundwork, I will investigate the mutual dependence of contract law 
and judicial decision making in stabilizing transactions and augmenting social benefit. In 
contrast to the traditional cost oriented literature (see Shavell 1981; Ehrlich and Posner 
1974;  Fon  and  Parisi  2009),  this  approach  also  takes  into  account  the  social  gains  of 
judicial signaling. In particular, it will be analyzed in which environment discrete court 
ruling is socially preferable to law making. 
  Assume the legislator is capable of identifying the optimal wage function W*(q) of 
a contracting problem. Given perfect legislation, this function can be applied to an infinite 
amount of contracts through the enactment of an adequate law. Such a legal rule is always 
binding to market participants and ideally leaves no room for dispute. Thus, the welfare 
reducing agency problem is eliminated. Consequently, the legislator seeks to rebuild the 
completeness of the contract through law making. 
  Furthermore,  consider  a  legal  rule  which  is  characterized  by  its  exogenous 
specificity   and     [0,1]. Then, a specificity of   = 0 reflects the lack of any binding 
rule, thereby endorsing the judge with complete freedom in deciding the case. In this 
setting, the written contract is the only guideline for the ruling of the court. It is fully left 
to the judge to apply and interpret its contents.8 8 8 8 Under complete specificity of legal rules, 
  = 1,  only  the  application  of  law  is  handed  over  to  the  judge.  Fully  derived  of 
discretion, the court acts like a mechanic enforcement element.9 9 9 9 However, if 0 <   < 1 
applies, the binding rule conveys a certain guideline, but still leaves room for judicial 
discretion.  
  Though  beneficial,  the  formation  of  legal  rules  always  comes  at  a  cost.  The 
function  ( ) denotes the incurred costs of legislation, contingent on the specificity of 
                                                           
8 8 8 8 See chapter 3 for details on the polar case with complete judicial discretion. 
9 9 9 9 MAX WEBER, a German sociologist and political economist, created the term ‘Rechtsautomat’ or ‘enforcement 
machine’ for judges who efficiently went through their workload of pending cases. It compares standardized 
legal procedures and routines to the benefits of industrialization (see Weber, [1922] 2005, pp. 649). 12 
 
the  created  law.  It  is  intuitive  that  the  expenses  of  the  legislator  for  planning, 
coordination  and  promulgation  of  legal  rules  are  dependent  on  their  precision.  In 
particular,  more  specificity  requires  more  expensive  research  to  gain  and  process  the 
required  information.  Assume  lim →   ( ) = 0  and  lim →   ( ) =  ∞ .  Clearly, 
totally abstaining from law making avoids legislative costs. In the other extreme case, the 
hypothetical  ideal  of  a  perfectly  binding  legal  rule  without  any  discretion  produces 
prohibitively  high  costs  and  is  hence  unobtainable  for  the  law  maker.  In  contrast  to 
legislative  expenses,  the  costs  of  adjudication  per  case  are  covered  by  the  charged 
litigating fees    +   . 
  The integration of the specificity of legal rules into the contract model is achieved 
as follows: Generally, the level of judicial discretion at stage 4   litigations is dependent on 
the  specificity  .  Thus,  the  rational  agent  expects  the  court  to  assess  the  quality  of 
performance  according  to  the  enacted  legal  directive.  His  expected  payoff  [∏   in 
litigation yields 
      ∏   =      −  1 −    1 −           −          −      (7) 
An  increase  in  the  specificity  of  legal  rules   significantly  minimizes  the  impact  of 
judgement errors and hence raises the agent´s expected payoff in court (7). As before, the 
agent expects to bear his share of the litigation costs   . The optimization problem of the 
profit  maximizing  principal  is  then  determined  analogical  to  the  basic  model  at  the 
following  stages.  Eventually,  the  principal  maximizes  his  revenue  with  respect  to  the 
decision q according to  
    ∏      =       −       
  ⇒     !           (8) 
         −         ≥ 
             
                                (9) 
          −  1 −    1 −           −          −    ≥       (10) 
Given that the incentive compatibility constraint (9) and the participation constraint (10) 
are binding in optimum, the profit maximizing quality q* is derived from the following 
First   Order Condition 
   
 ´   
 ´    = 
           
                       ≥ 1           (11)  
At last, this determines the optimal wage 
  ∗        
    
                
               
                
As revealed by (11), only the 
this condition illustrates the 
For the principal, it is de facto irrelevant whether the 
to the setting of legal rules or because of judicial 
means of law making are suitable to manipulate 
However, the legislative costs of society 
From an overall economic perspective, t
environment can be stylized by the following welfare function
        ∑
At this level, the social net benefit is defined by contrasting the social gain of N individual 
contracts to the incurred legislative costs 
contracting parties, variable costs of adju
avoided. As depicted in Figure 3, both means of law making
on the implemented social outcome.
Figure 3. Figure 3. Figure 3. Figure 3.
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At last, this determines the optimal wage function W*(q) of the contract as
         
                 ∗ 
                               ,     
     ∗ 
                                                     ,     
only the trivial case (      1 or     1) produces the First
 steering mechanism of legal rules on optimiz
de facto irrelevant whether the desired quality q* is 
to the setting of legal rules or because of judicial discretion and signaling
suitable to manipulate individual decisions and 
However, the legislative costs of society      stay irrelevant at the contract level
From an overall economic perspective, the social outcome of contracts in this legal 
environment can be stylized by the following welfare function B:   
∑                  
              
At this level, the social net benefit is defined by contrasting the social gain of N individual 
contracts to the incurred legislative costs     . Due to the rational expectations of the 
contracting parties, variable costs of adjudication do not apply as litigation is 
As depicted in Figure 3, both means of law making then induce different effects 
on the implemented social outcome. 
Figure 3. Figure 3. Figure 3. Figure 3. Specificity of law and Social Benefit 
function W*(q) of the contract as 
      ∗
      ∗
    (12) 
produces the First Best. Still, 
of legal rules on optimizing individuals. 
quality q* is established due 
discretion and signaling. Evidently, both 
individual decisions and social outcome. 
at the contract level. 
he social outcome of contracts in this legal 
 
    (13) 
At this level, the social net benefit is defined by contrasting the social gain of N individual 
Due to the rational expectations of the 
as litigation is generally 
induce different effects 
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As the specificity of law rises, the discretion of courts is more and more bound to legal 
rules.  Hence,  contractors  are  increasingly  relieved  of  judicial  errors  in  litigation, 
consequently relaxing the pressure on the optimal wage function. This enlarges the net 
benefit of the contract. However, the legislative costs increase and steadily reduce the 
social outcome. A low specificity of legal rules avoids these costs, but strains litigating 
parties with a growing risk of judicial error. In turn, the pressure on the wage function 
intensifies and the implemented quality decreases. 
  Consider homogenous labor contracts only and denote the implemented qualities 
by  the  contracting  parties  contingent  on  the  specificity  of  legal  rules  as  q*(γ),  the 
optimization problem of a benevolent legislator is simplified to 
         =   ∙   [q∗(γ)] −  C[q∗(γ)]  −  R(γ)
  ⇒     !    (14) 
Thus, the optimal specificity of law γ* can be determined, defining the efficient relation of 
legislative law making and judicial discretion. Implicitly, the choice of γ* by the legislator 
frames the amount of law making power transferred to the courts.  
  As  a  corollary  of  the  above  findings,  this  analysis  supports  the  existence  of  an 
optimal specificity of law, which maximizes social outcome. The actual optimal specificity 
of legal rules γ* depends on two criteria: Firstly, the characteristics of the particular field 
of law are relevant: the costs of legislation  ( ) and the accuracy of judicial decision 
making  (   ;     ).  In  contrast  to  traditional  literature,  the  significance of  adjudicative 
costs is superseded by the quality of judicial signals. Secondly, these findings also reveal 
the impact of the specific market structure: the buyer´s valuation V(q), the cost function 
C(q) of the seller and the amount of transactions N. Consequently, the legislator´s choice 
of γ* will vary with different fields of law and diverse markets. 
 
5.  5.  5.  5.         ON ON ON ON       THE COMPOSITION OF  THE COMPOSITION OF  THE COMPOSITION OF  THE COMPOSITION OF CONTRACT  CONTRACT  CONTRACT  CONTRACT LAW LAW LAW LAW       
         
These results provide theoretical insights on the socially desirable amount of law making 
power of courts. This approach suggests that for the rational lawmaker, the significance of 
judicial discretion is bound to its ability to complement legislation.  15 
 
  Consider  the  relevant  characteristics  of  the  field  of  law:  The  legislative  cost 
function      , which limits the ability of the law maker to effectively enact rules on his 
own,  and  the  accuracy  of  court  ruling      ;      ,  which  reflects  the  ability  to  verify 
contracts  through  discretion.  As 
  
     0,  the  particular  slope  of  the  legislator´s  cost 
function is decisive: A smooth slope enables the law maker to reach specific rules at low 
costs, hence guiding effectively the economic activity. A transparent, stable environment 
and simplicity of bilateral relations favour such specific legal rules. However, the legislator 
will only implement vague standards and transfers their interpretation to courts, if he 
bears a steep incline in costs. In that case, relations between contractors are often complex 
and subject to frequent change, putting specific rules at the risk of obsolescence. Also, 
valid information may be difficult to obtain (see especially Fon and Parisi 2009). From a 
political  economy  perspective,  high  levels  of  rule  specificity  also  require  successful 
bargaining  of  political  decision  makers,  hence  induce  strategic  behavior  and  socially 
wasteful conflict. This constraint is presumably relevant in labor law: as employment is 
vital  to  voters,  any  labor  legislation  may  have  to  face  exceptionally  volatile  political 
opposition.  But  as  bargaining  costs  increase  for  the  decision  maker,  less  degrees  of 
specificity are preferred. In this setting, the transfer of lawmaking authority to courts does 
not promote efficiency, but indicates a lack of interest of the legislator. 
Generally, the accuracy of court ruling,      ;      , signals to contracting parties 
their chances to verify the contract. At large, the accuracy is determined by the particular 
judiciary  system  itself  and  includes  concepts  of  education,  legal  practice  and  career 
incentives. It is plausible that judges, who repeatedly work on similar law suits, learn 
valuable information more rapidly and gain experience. Hence, specialized courts may 
learn faster to correctly assess legal claims (see Shapiro and Sweet 2002, p. 93; Posner 
1996, pp. 244 64). Judicial decisions then gain reliability in complementing the law and a 
decrease in the specificity of rules may save legislative costs.  
In contrast to traditional literature (Landes and Posner 1976; Posner and Ehrlich 
1974;  Fon  and  Parisi  2009),  this  analysis  suggests  only  minor  relevance  of  variable 
adjudicative  costs,  if  judicial  signaling  prevails  as  the  primary  function  of  courts  and 16 
 
rational  expectations  apply.  The  scope  of  this  signal,  affecting  an  infinite  number  of 
contracts at low costs, indicates that previous work may have systematically overestimated 
the optimal specificity of law.10 10 10 10 
  The actual market structure is the second determinant to optimal specificity of 
rules.  The  higher  the  attainable  benefit  of  a  single  contract,    ∗) −   ( ∗),  the  more 
preferable is the guidance of specific and costly rules. Consequently, the implemented 
specificity  is  higher.  Furthermore,  the  size  of  the  market,  defines  as  N  homogenous 
transactions,  yields  the  same  implication:  the  bigger  the  market  size,  the  higher  the 
attainable  benefit.  However,  significant  market  volatility  reduces  the  number  of 
homogenous contracts, resulting in a lower specificity of law. 
  In addition to the illustrated rationale of judicial signaling, the contract model also 
sheds new light on the observed convergence of legal systems and on the controversial 
virtue  of  court  ruling  (see  Rubin 1977,  Priest 1977;  Shavell 1981;  Cooter  and 
Rubinfeld 1989;  Niblett,  Shleifer  and  Posner 2008):  As  long  as  legislation  is  costly,  a 
discrete court, though imperfect, is an irreplaceable complement even to the ideal law 
maker. This explains the recent tendency in civil law states to give more weight to judicial 
adaption and interpretation of codified law.  The contract model also suggests that due to 
the  inevitable  imperfection of  adjudication,  unframed  discretion  of courts  may  induce 
legal uncertainty and thus raise the pressure on the wage function. Consequently, the 
obtainable social outcome decreases. The growing intervention of legislation in common 
law  systems  may  be  traced  to  this  finding.  The  contract  model  also  provides  formal 
evidence for the common thesis: If markets and societies change, so does the law. 
  For future research, the analysis can easily be extended to other legal fields, if some 
basic  assumptions  are  met:  as  the  focus  is  on  the  polarity  of judicial  law  making  and 
legislation, the model is basically applicable for codified law systems. Nevertheless, many 
common law states have introduced legal statutes aside case law.11 11 11 11 Hence, the setting is 
                                                           
10 10 10 10 In this contract setting, adjudicative costs have distributive effects only, as parties negotiate under common 
beliefs. Only if there are discrepancies in the expectation of court ruling, socially wasteful litigation occurs. Even 
then, the beneficial effects of judicial signaling on numerous undisputed contracts still have to be compared to 
the costs of actually filed cases, thus reducing variable adjudicative costs. 
11 11 11 11 For example, the role of legislation played in contract law is large and growing in the United States and 
England. For further detail see Atiyah (2005) and Goldmann (1996 ). Thus, these fields of law have turned into a 17 
 
also suitable for any mixed doctrine of common and codified law to evaluate the allocation 
of rulemaking responsibility. 
A critical precondition for the application of the model is the privity of contract 
and its consensual nature. Transactions have to be voluntary. Without the existence of an 
outside option, the participation constraint does not apply. Furthermore, the transaction 
has to establish a principal – agent asymmetry in the contract relations. This limits the 
application of the model to treaty law, customary law and private law areas. Even though 
the rationale of judicial signaling and of the legislative cost function is also intuitive for 
public, criminal and tort law, the element of coercion defeats the consensual contract 
setting. 
 
6. 6. 6. 6.        CONCLUSION CONCLUSION CONCLUSION CONCLUSION       
       
The principal contribution of this article is the formal analysis of benefits and limitations 
of  judicial  law  making  from  a  contract  theoretic  perspective.  In  contrast  to  previous 
literature, this approach relates the court´s ability in dispute resolution to preexistent 
binding  legal  rules  while  taking  into  account  the  maximizing  behavior  of  market 
participants.  Using  a  model  of  incomplete  labor  contracts  as  institutional  setting,  it  is 
shown that the stipulated principal agent game can be stabilized through the signaling 
effect  of  previous  court  ruling.  Thus,  the  labor  contract  is  made  contingent  on  the 
expected accuracy of the judicial decision and enforcement, even though the performance 
of the agent could not be verified perfectly in court, if dispute arised. It is intuitive that 
the implemented outcome increases with the accuracy of court ruling. 
  Introducing binding legal rules into the contract setting, the discretion of the judge 
is restricted. Thus the specificity of these legal rules controls the agency problem of the 
contract, but comes at increasing costs for society. Consequently, an optimal specificity of 
law can be determined which maximizes social outcome and defines the efficient relation 
of legislative law making and judicial discretion. The desirable amount of law making 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
mixture of common law and codified law system, evolving to different points on a spectrum of judicial law 
making and legislation. 18 
 
power transferred to courts then depends on the characteristics of the particular field of 
law and on the actual market structure. Small, rapidly evolving markets combined with 
high costs of information for the legislator favor judicial law making. However, the model 
suggests a mutual dependency between legislation and adjudication to establish efficiency 
in law, contradicting the traditional legal doctrines of exclusiveness. In fact, incomplete 
information and agency problems may form a major reason for the observed convergence 
of  legal  systems.  Thus,  the  contract  setting  provides  new  insights  on  the  economic 
function  of  judges:  complementing  legal  rules,  judicial  discretion  and  signaling  are 
decisive to stabilize numerous contracts and transactions. 
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APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX       
1.  1.  1.  1.         Risk Risk Risk Risk       a a a averse  verse  verse  verse a a a agent gent gent gent       a a a and  nd  nd  nd l l l limited  imited  imited  imited l l l liability iability iability iability 
Assume  a  monotonous  VON NEUMANN  MORGENSTERN utility  function  U.  Beginning  at 
Stage 4, the expectations of the agent in courtroom yield:   
          ∏         ∙  [ ( )] +  1 −      ∙  [ (   )] −   [  ]      (A1) 
Given  the  monotony  of  the  utility  function,  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint 
remains unchanged. Then the principal maximizes his payoff as follows: 
      ∏  ( ) =   ( ) −   ( ) 
  ⇒     !             (A2) 
       ( ) −   (   ) ≥ 
 ( )   (   )
          
              (A3) 
      ∙  [ ( )] +  1 −      ∙  [ (   )] −   [  ] ≡  [ ( )]    (A4) 
Assuming infinite risk aversion of the agent, (A4) can be simplified to:    
       (   ) −    =  ( )                (A5) 
Condition  (A5)  also  holds  in  case  of  limited  liability  of  the  agent,  which  requires 
 ( ) ≥  0. The First Order Condition follows as  
   
 ´( )
 ´( ) = 
            
         
                  (A6) 
and the profit maximizing wage function W*(q) then is 
    ∗ ( ) =  
 ( )
         
+   (  ∗) +                       ,      ≤   ∗   
                ( ∗) 
         
+                      ,      >   ∗
        (A7) 
 
2. 2. 2. 2.        Succumbing party bears litigation cost Succumbing party bears litigation cost Succumbing party bears litigation cost Succumbing party bears litigation cost       
Consider the costs of enforcement  ( ) contingent on quality to satisfy  ´( ) < 0 and 
 (  ∗) = 0. Consequently, the successful party does not bear any trial costs. Beginning 
at Stage 4, the expectations of the agent in courtroom yield: 
   [∏          ( ) +  1 −      (   ) −  1 −       (   )      (B1) 
The principal maximizes his payoff: 20 
 
    ∏  ( ) =   ( ) −   ( ) 
  ⇒     !           (B2) 
     ( ) −   (   ) ≥ 
 ( )   (   )
          
−   (   )       (B3) 
         ( ) +  1 −      (   ) −  1 −       (   ) ≥  ( )       (B4) 
This determines the First Order Condition as 
   
 ´( )
 ´( ) = 
        
         
                  (B5) 
and the profit maximizing wage function then is 
    ∗ ( ) =  
 ( )
          
− 
      ( ∗)
         
+   ( )      ,if 0 ≤ q  ≤ q ∗           
            ( ∗)
         
                                ,if q >   ∗                     
 (C6) 
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Figure 1 Figure 1 Figure 1 Figure 1.   Extensive form of the contracting game 
Figure 2 Figure 2 Figure 2 Figure 2. . . .  Implication of judicial signaling 
Figure 3. Figure 3. Figure 3. Figure 3.   Specificity of law and social benefit 
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